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American Films in China: An Analysis of
China's Intellectual Property Record and
Reconsideration of Cultural Trade
Exceptions Amidst Rampant Piracy
Carl Erik Heiberg
INTRODUCTION
New technology has created new problems for the Motion
Picture Industry Association of America (MPAA)l as it attempts
to protect against the illegal reproduction and distribution of
American movies.! The MPAA faces particular problems in
China, a country widely criticized for its poor record of intel-
lectual property (IP) rights protection.3 China's IP legislation
and enforcement efforts were major issues in its trade nego-
tiations with the United States and in its accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).4 While China's IP regime has seen
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Swarthmore
College, 1996. This Note is dedicated to my mother, Carol, for all of the love,
encouragement, and joy she has given me throughout my life. I would also like to
thank my father, Glenn, and my wife, Julia, for all of their love and support, as well
as Jingjie Lu for her suggestions on my article.
1. Originally formed as a trade association for American films, today the
MPAA represents seven major film studios and functions as the "voice and advocate
of the American motion picture, home video and television industries." About MPA,
MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). The Motion Picture
Association (MPA) is the international arm of the MPAA. Id.
2. See Alan Butterworth, Illegal Downloading: Group Sues Movie Pirates,
MINN. DAILY, Nov. 19, 2004, at 1; Tom Zeller, Jr., As Piracy Battle Nears Supreme
Court, the Messages Grow Manic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at C1. See generally
Jeanmarie LoVoi, Competing Interests: Anti-piracy Efforts Triumph Under TRIPS
but New Copying Technology Undermines the Success, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 445
(1999); John Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and Patent
Enforcement in the Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45 (2003).
3. Joseph Kahn & Helene Cooper, China Plans to Cut Tariffs, End Quotas in
Bid to Join Trade Group, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A10.
4. See Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and
Chinese Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587,
587 (2003); Kahn & Cooper, supra note 3. The WTO was established in April 1994 to
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great improvements over the last few years, major problems
continue to exist across all IP sectors.'
Compounding China's inadequate IP enforcement efforts is
a supply problem created by quotas the country imposes on
imports of foreign films.6  Despite quotas and other import
restrictions, many Chinese citizens watch the latest American
theatrical releases in the privacy of their homes while the res-
tricted movies are still in U.S. theaters and not even legally
showing in China.7 Such restrictions are permitted despite
China's WTO membership because, due to a cultural exception,
movies are not subject to the same trade liberalization require-
ments that prevent China from protecting other industries.8
Part I of this Note examines the existing copyright pro-
tection and other IP rights in China. Part L.A provides a short
history of copyright law in China. Part I.B describes China's
recent international IP commitments. Part I.C analyzes China's
actual enforcement of such commitments. Part II discusses the
administer multilateral trading rules originally established under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See generally The Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement] (formalizing the GATT's coverage of the international
trade of goods and providing rules for other areas such as services, intellectual
property, and agriculture). From January 1, 1948, until the entrance into force of the
WTO on January 1, 1995, the GATT provided the basic rules of multilateral trading.
See generally WTO, http://www.wto.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). The original
GATT is now often referred to as GATT 1947 to distinguish it from GATT 1994,
which sets out the main WTO rules that relate specifically to trade in goods. See id.
5. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NAT'L TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 57 (2004), available at
http://ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/20041
2004_NationalTradeEstimate/2004_- NTEReport/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter
USTR 2004 Report]; U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIJING, CHINA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE
FY 2004, at 17 (2004) [hereinafter China 2004 Commercial Guide].
6. See U.S.-China Trade: Preparations for the J. Commission on Commerce
and Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 45-55 (2004)
(testimony of Fritz E. Attaway, Executive Vice President and Wash. General
Counsel, MPAA) [hereinafter Attaway Testimony].
7. See generally SHUJEN WANG, GLOBALIZATION AND FILM DISTRIBUTION IN
GREATER CHINA (2003) (tracing the legal and illegal distribution of American films
in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan).
8. See Alan Riding, A Global Culture War Pits Protectionists Against Free
Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at B9; Gen. Conference of the U.N. Educ.,
Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], 25 Questions on Culture, Trade and
Globalisation: What Do We Generally Understand by "Cultural Exception"?,
http://portal.unesco.org (follow "Culture" hyperlink, then follow "Cultural
Industries" hyperlink, then follow "FAQs" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 10, 2005)
[hereinafter UNESCO Cultural Exception Definition].
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various methods China uses to restrict market access for foreign
films. Part III presents a short discussion of the history of cul-
tural exemptions to free trade. Part IV analyzes China's
enforcement efforts and asks whether cultural exemptions
should exist at all in light of China's rampant IP enforcement
problems. Although all problems would not completely
disappear, China should provide greater access to foreign films
in order to meet its international IP obligations. This Note
concludes that the United States should negotiate a formal
instrument to govern international trade in cultural products
and take a hard line in order to ensure that such an agreement
addresses the IP problems created by restricting access to
foreign films and other media.
I. PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA
Despite being one of the earliest countries to develop
printing,9 China's promulgation of a copyright law that met
international standards came near the end of the twentieth
century.10 The concept of a property right attaching to one's own
creative work that developed in seventeenth and eighteenth
century Europe simply had no equivalent in China.1' Many
9. Included in the many inventions to which China is credited with bringing
to the world are paper, ink and movable type. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To
STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE
CIVILIZATION (1995) (providing an in-depth study of the historical attitudes toward
copyright in China); HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2002) (detailing the development of China's
copyright laws).
10. See CHENGSI ZHENG & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA 17
(1991) (discussing China's first official copyright law in 1910 and the enactment of a
law meeting international standards in 1990); Connie Neigel, Piracy in Russia and
China: A Different U.S. Reaction, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 189-93 (2000)
(tracing the development of China's copyright laws). Prior to the promulgation of
official laws, and even prior to the invention of the printing press, China's rulers did
seek to prevent the unauthorized reproduction of written materials, but such efforts
were designed to maintain the authority of those in power rather than protect the
ownership rights of authors to their works. See id. at 189-91 & nn.68, 73-74.
11. See Neigel, supra note 10, at 190. Conversely, England enacted the Statute
of Queen Anne in 1709, widely considered to be the first law on author's rights. Id.
at 180 n.1 (citing EDWARD W. PLOWMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 12 (1980)); see also Evans, supra
20061
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commentators cite the dominance of Confucianism on Chinese
culture as a major reason for the lack of development of IP
rights in China. 
12
The Confucian vision of nature and civilization mandated
that all individuals have access to a shared intellectual past."
In Confucian tradition, individuals predominately learned by
copying the past, and as a result "the copying of works of almost
any kind has for centuries been regarded as honorable and
necessary."" Indeed, according to Confucianism, copying or imi-
tation was not a "moral offense, but rather 'a noble art'-a 'time-
honored learning process' through which people manifested
respect for their ancestors." 5 Confucian philosophy undoubted-
ly looked down upon individual ownership of ideas, but copy-
right development was also hampered both by the lack of a
means to mass produce literary works and by a limited demand
due to China's low literacy rate. 6
As China began to have greater interaction with Western
nations in the late nineteenth century, it was introduced to the
legal concepts of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. 7 And in
1910, China's Qing Dynasty enacted the country's first formal
copyright law." The law offered extensive copyright protection,
but was never fully implemented as the Qing government was
overthrown a year later in the Nationalist Revolution.' China's
Nationalist government revised the copyright statute, but when
Mao Zedong's Communist Party assumed control of China in
1949, all existing copyright laws were retracted as part of the
national expulsion of foreign nationals and Western concepts.20
note 4, at 589-90 (noting copying was widely encouraged by imperial rulers and did
not have a negative connotation as in the West).
12. See Ling Li, The Sky Is High and the Emperor Is Far Way: The Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Law in China, 108 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO
COMPARADO 951, 954 (2003).
13. See id.
14. See id. (quoting N. Wingrove, China Traditions Oppose War on IP Piracy,
38 RES. TECH. MGMT. 3 (1995)).
15. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 331, 361 (2003).
16. See ALFORD, supra note 9, at 19. China's literacy rate remained below
twenty percent into the early twentieth century. Id.; see also Yu, supra note 15, at
360-64 (commenting that while the cultural explanations, Confucian tradition, and
pro-copying culture provide insight into an important barrier to IP law reform in
China, other factors including socialism and xenophobia were no less important).
17. See PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 3 (1997).
18. ZHENG & PENDELTON, supra note 10, at 17.
19. Neigel, supra note 10, at 190-91.
20. See id. When the Communists first came to power, the government did
initiate a system of publishing contracts that provided for remuneration between
222 [Vol. 15:1
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In addition, despite the fact that Mao's government sought to
replace Confucian values with Communist ones, the infusion of
Communist ideas did not change the country's view with respect
to intellectual property rights---"owning property [in a Socialist
system] is tantamount to sin."2' Furthermore, during various
class struggles and China's Cultural Revolution, many intellec-
tuals were tortured, killed, imprisoned, or sent to communes; as
a result, "most creative intellectual work was stopped and copy-
right infringement was rampant" during much of this period.22
After Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in
1976, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders sought to renew China's
commercial ties with the United States, Japan, and other
Western developed countries. 3 China's lack of IP legislation
and the historical treatment of IP under both Confucianism and
socialism understandably made foreign nationals apprehensive
about investing their technology and other IP into China.2 4 As
China began entering into trade agreements with Western
nations, foreign countries began pressuring China to enact more
protective IP laws.2
B. CHINA'S RECENT INTERNATIONAL IP COMMITMENTS
1. Bilateral Trade Agreements With and IP Pressures From the
United States
The 1979 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China
(1979 Trade Agreement)26 was one of modern China's first im-
authors and publishers. Id. These contracts, however, did not prevent unauthorized
reproduction by third parties and in the following decades the remuneration system
was eliminated and unauthorized reproduction increased. See id.
21. Yu, supra note 15, at 361 (quoting Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual
Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International
Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1998)); see also Li, supra note 12, at 955.
"Under the socialist economic system, property belongs to the State and the people,
rather than private owners. Authors thus create literary and artistic works for the
welfare of the State, rather than for the purpose of generating economic benefits for
themselves." Yu, supra note 15, at 362.
22. Neigel, supra note 10, at 191 & n.91; see also Yu, supra note 15, at 361-62.
23. See FENG, supra note 17, at 4950; Yu, supra note 15, at 354.
24. See Li, supra note 12, at 954; Neigel, supra note 10, at 191; Peggy Yeh, Yo,
Ho, Ho and a CD-Rom: The Current State of Software Piracy in the PRC, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173, 175-76 (1999); Yu, supra note 15, at 361.
25. See Neigel, supra note 10, at 192.
26. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
2006]
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portant trade agreements with a foreign country. In terms of
copyright protection, the 1979 Trade Agreement provided that
China and the United States would each take measures to
ensure copyright protection for the legal or natural persons of
the other party. 7 Although China had not yet enacted modem
IP laws, when it signed the 1979 Trade Agreement China took
on obligations to provide international IP protection." China
followed the 1979 Trade Agreement by joining international IP
organizations and enacting its first IP laws. In response to
pressure from the United States, China finally enacted a
modern copyright law that met international standards in
1990.30 However, despite the enactment of the 1990 Copyright
Law, rampant piracy of both domestic and foreign films, as well
as other artistic works, continued.3'
As U.S. businesses became increasingly concerned about ex-
tensive piracy of their audiovisual products and computer soft-
ware, they lobbied the U.S. government to apply economic
the People's Republic of China, U.S.-P.R.C., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4652.
27. Id. at 4657-58. The 1979 Trade Agreement contained similar provisions
with respect to trademarks and patents. See id.
28. See HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA: A
COMPLETE GUIDE 5 (1999).
29. China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) in 1980 and shortly thereafter joined the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised
at the Stockholm Conference, July 14, 1967). China's first IP legislation included a
new trademark statute-Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shang biao fa
* 4,R#*QMROA [Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective
Mar. 1, 1993) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/flfg/
ygzscqgflfgt20011030_2149.htm [hereinafter PRC Trademark Law]-and a new
patent statute-Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhuan li fa A ,iK Ui*
[Patent Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulaged by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/flfg/fljxzfg/t200llO29_- 1919.htm [hereinafter PRC Patent
Law]. The PRC Trademark was subsequently amended in 1993 and 2001; the PRC
Patent Law was subsequently amended in 1992 and 2001. As China drafted its
initial IP legislation, its government remained leery of introducing any concept of
private property into the socialist economic system. See Yu, supra note 15, at 356-
57. As such, the laws were drafted to give individuals rights over their inventions,
while at the same time promoting socialist ideals-much in line with Deng
Xiaoping's concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." See ALFORD, supra
note 9, at 70.
30. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhu zuo quan fa -
[Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) (P.R.C.), available
at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servletlservlet.info.NatLawServlet?action=list&id=367
[hereinafter 1990 Copyright Law].
31. See Yu, supra note 15, at 357-58.
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pressure on China." The U.S. power to threaten economic sanc-
tions is primarily grounded in the Omnibus Trade Competi-
tiveness Act (1988 U.S. Trade Act).3 The 1988 U.S. Trade Act
contains a provision known as Special 30134 which authorizes
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)35 to use trade sanctions
and other restrictions on market access to retaliate for a trading
partner's inadequate protection of U.S. IP rights.3 ' Throughout
the late 1980s and early 1990s the U.S. government responded
to the requests of U.S. businesses by threatening China multiple
times with trade wars, economic sanctions, non-renewal of most-
favored-nation status, and opposition to China's entry into the
32. See id.; Neigel, supra note 10, at 192-93.
33. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
34. Id. §§ 1301, 1303, 102 Stat. at 1164-76, 1179-81 [hereinafter Special 301]
(amending the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-316, §§ 302(b), 182). For a detailed
discussion of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and Special 301,
see Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires
an Internal Focus and TWO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941, 1965-67
(1998).
35. The USTR is a cabinet-level official who serves as an advisor to the
President on trade policy, coordinates the development of U.S. trade policy
initiatives, leads U.S. international trade negotiations, and seeks to expand U.S.
exports by promoting the removals of or reductions in foreign trade barriers.
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TERMS 172-73 (1996).
36. Special 301, supra note 34. When taking an action against a country
through Special 301, the United States first places a country on one of three lists:
the priority foreign country list, the priority watch list, or the watch list. Cheng,
supra note 34, at 1965-67. The priority foreign country category is reserved for
countries that have committed more onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices
in the area of intellectual property, have the greatest adverse economic impact on
the United States, and have failed to enter into good faith negotiations or to make
significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1).
Countries on the priority watch list differ from priority foreign countries in that
these countries have negotiated in good faith or are making significant progress in
their negotiations. USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities
and Special 301 on Intellectual Property, released May 15, 1989, 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 715, 719 (May 31, 1989). Countries on the watch list, the least serious of the
three categories, are identified by the United States due to their questionable
intellectual property systems. USTR, 1995 Trade Policy Agenda and 1994 Annual
Report 58, 98 (1994). In addition to these three lists, China and Paraguay are
subject to another part of the statute, Section 306 monitoring, because of previous
agreements reached with the United States to address specific problems raised in
earlier USTR reports. USTR, Special 301 Full Report, May 1, 2003, available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports Publications/2003/2003-Special_30
1Report/asset_upload file665_6124.pdf. After placing a country on one of these
lists, the USTR initiates an investigation and consults with the country in question;
if no resolution has been reached after six months, the USTR is authorized to take
various unilateral actions, including initiating trade sanctions against the foreign
nation. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2414 (1988); Cheng, supra note 34, at 1966.
20061
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WTO. " These threats eventually led to the signing of a Memo-
randum of Understanding in 1992 (1992 MOU),38 an IP agree-
ment in 1995 (1995 Agreement)," and an accord that reiterated
China's commitment to IP protection in 1996 (1996 Accord).40
By signing the 1992 MOU, China agreed to join two inter-
national copyright conventions-the Berne Convention 4' and the
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phono-
grams. China also amended its 1990 Copyright Law and
issued implementing regulations in accordance with the provi-
sions of the 1992 MOU.48 Despite the regulatory improvements
resulting from the 1992 MOU, the United States became in-
creasingly frustrated with China's lack of enforcement of its IP
laws. In an attempt to curb China's woeful enforcement record,
the United States placed China on the Priority Foreign Country
List in 1994 and also threatened Special 301 trade sanctions on
Chinese products.44
Averting a trade war,45 the two countries signed the 1995
37. See Neigel, supra note 10, at 192-93; Yu, supra note 15, at 357-58.
38. Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United
States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, P.R.C.-US. Jan. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S.
No. 12036, 34 I.L.M. 677 (1995) [hereinafter 1992 MOU]. See also Peter K Yu, From
Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-first
Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142-43 (2000) (discussing the 1992 MOU).
39. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, P.R.C.-U.S., Feb. 26,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]. See also Yu, supra note 38,
at 145-48 (discussing the 1995 Agreement).
40. Chinese Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement, June 17, 1996, P.R.C.-U.S., available at http://www.export.gov/tcc (click
on "View Trade Agreements"; then click on "List All Agreements"; then click on
"People's Republic Of China Implementation Of The 1995 Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement-1996") [hereinafter the 1996 Accord]. See also Yu, supra note
38, at 150-51 (discussing the 1996 Accord).
41. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971). The Berne Convention
is widely seen as the birth of international copyright protection, as it created a union
of member states committed to multilateral protection of each other's literary and
artistic works. See Cheng, supra note 34, at 1945; see also 1992 MOU, supra note
38, at 680-81 (stipulating that China would adhere to the Berne Convention and
would submit legislation authorizing such accession).
42. Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309. See also 1992 MOU, supra note 38, at 681
(stipulating that China would accede to and ratify the Geneva Convention).
43. Zhu zuo quan fa shi shi tiao li J [Copyright Law
Implementing Regulations] (promulgated by the Nat'l Copyright Admin., May 30,
1991, effective June 1, 1991) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servlet/
servlet.info.NatLawServlet?action=list&id=369; Yu, supra note 15, at 358.
44. Neigel, supra note 10, at 194.
45. China responded to threatened U.S. sanctions with threats of its own. Id.
226 [Vol. 15:1
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Agreement,4 s which was designed to further strengthen China's
developing domestic IP rights protection regime. In order to
increase enforcement of existing IP laws, the 1995 Agreement
created enforcement Task Forces, which serve various police
functions in pursuing IP violations. 48  The agreement further
called for greater market access for U.S. IP, the registration of
foreign audiovisual products and computer software with
China's National Copyright Administration, the training of
officials on IP rights, and the intensification of Customs inspec-
tions on imports and exports of digital media.49
Despite China's promises in the 1995 Agreement to crack
down on music, film, and software piracy, U.S. investigators
found that China had taken no action against some of the worst
offenders of compact disc piracy. 0 Acting USTR Charlene
Barshefsky announced that China would again be placed on the
Foreign Country List. Within thirty minutes of the announce-
ment, China retaliated by announcing it would place 100%
tariffs on a list of U.S. products.51 A multibillion dollar trade
war was again averted, however, when the two countries signed
the 1996 Accord52 on the June 17, 1996 deadline, the date at
which such tariffs were set to go into effect.53 The 1996 Accord
reflected many of the same terms of the 1995 Agreement, but
In essence, the United States was dissatisfied with China's efforts to enforce the
laws while China was upset that it had taken such diligent measures to revamp its
intellectual property rights regime and the United States was not patient enough to
wait for the system to achieve its desired results. See id.
46. See supra note 39.
47. Id. The 1995 Agreement called for the creation of China's State Council
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights and a "unique copyright
verification system, proposing to punish by administrative and judicial means any
manufacturer of audiovisual products who failed to comply" with the verification
system. Yu, supra note 15, at 359.
48. The Task Forces are comprised of administrative and other authorities that
are responsible for intellectual property protection. See 1995 Agreement, supra note
39. Such authorities include China's National Copyright Administration, State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, Patent Office, police at various levels,
and customs officials. Yu, supra note 15, at 359 n.224. Task Forces are authorized
to enter and search the premises of those allegedly infringing on intellectual
property rights, review books and records, seal suspected goods, and confiscate
materials and implements used to make infringing goods. Id.
49. Id. at 359-60; Neigel, supra note 10, at 194.
50. See Neigel, supra note 10, at 195; see also Evans, supra note 4, at 599-600
(noting that "crackdowns proved ephemeral, as domestic counterfeiters found new
and more effective ways to circumvent the laws").
51. See Neigel, supra note 10, at 195.
52. See supra note 40.
53. Id.
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
China's efforts to combat piracy that year convinced U.S.
officials that this time China meant to carry out its obligations.54
Piracy of U.S. films, music, and software remained rampant
despite such efforts, but the United States moved away from
coercive efforts and threats of trade sanctions after the 1996
Accord.55 As China made preparations to enter the WTO, how-
ever, it made significant institutional reforms to improve IP pro-
tection.56
2. The Effect of China's WTO Entrance on Its Copyright Laws
On November 8, 2001, WTO member states approved
China's accession to the body, and China officially became a
member on December 11, 2001.17 In preparation for WTO entry,
China amended its 1990 Copyright Law.58 China's amended
Copyright Law, which became effective as of late 2001, streng-
thened protection of copyrights by broadening protection and
increasing penalties for violations. s The amendments also
54. Id. at 196 & n.125. Such steps to combat piracy included "the closure of
fifteen pirate CD factories and the enlistment of China's powerful national police,
the Ministry of Public Security to help combat piracy." Id. at 195-96.
55. 1996 Accord, supra note 40 at 196; Yu, supra note 15, at 365.
56. Yu, supra note 15, at 365.
57. See Press Release 252, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves
China's Accession (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/pres0l e/pr252_- e.htm. For details on the terms of China's accession, see
Press Release 243, WTO, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China's
Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
58. See generally Xiaoqing Feng & Frank Xianfeng Huang, International
Standards and Local Elements: New Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 917 (2002).
59. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhu zuo quan fa A.[ 1m 5
[Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China] (amended by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2001), available at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servlet/
servlet.info.NatLawServlet?action=list&id=372 [hereinafter Amended Copyright
Law]. Specifically, China's amended Copyright Law now authorizes administrative
agencies and courts to confiscate illegal profits and pirated copies, as well as the
materials and equipment used for infringing activities. Id. art. 47. Statutory
damages of up to RMB 500,000 can be assessed when the plaintiffs damage or the
infringer's profits cannot be determined. Id. art. 48. In addition, the amended
Copyright Law provides access to preliminary injunctions and addresses internet
copyright issues. Id. arts. 10, 37, 47, 49, 58. China enacted implementing
regulations for the amended Copyright Law in the following year. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo zhu zuo quan fa shi shi tiao li ,
[Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China Implementing Regulations]
(promulgated by the Nat'l Copyright Admin., effective Sept. 15, 2002) (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servlet/servlet.info.NatLawServlet?action=list
&id=373.
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improved China's compliance with the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement).60
China's poor intellectual property rights record had been a
major obstacle to China's accession to the WTO and, prior to its
creation, to the GATT. 6' Not coincidentally, many commen-
tators consider WTO membership to have been a major impetus
for improvements in China's IP legislation.62 However, while
WTO membership may have brought about improvements in
legislation to reflect international standards, actual enforce-
ment of those standards has remained inadequate.63
C. CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
1. Task Force Results
China claims to have made great strides in its enforce-
ment efforts. For example, in an anti-piracy campaign in March
2000, Task Forces 64 in Shanghai and Guangdong seized more
than 200,000 pirated DVDs of U.S. films and arrested twenty-
four people.65  The Shanghai Customs Bureau claims to have
cracked 210 IP cases in 2003, up 50% from its results in 2002.66
During a September 2004 news conference in Beijing, Zhang
60. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The
TRIPS Agreement came as a result of the dissatisfaction of the United States and
other Western countries with existing intellectual property conventions during the
1970s. Cheng, supra note 34, at 1948. The TRIPS Agreement focuses on domestic
legislation and enforcement of intellectual property rights in member countries. Id.
It incorporates the minimum standards of the Berne Convention, but extends
protection to newer forms of intellectual property, such as computer programs. Id.
at 1949.
61. See Kahn & Cooper, supra note 3, at A10 (describing how China's poor
record of IP enforcement posed an obstacle to WTO entry).
62. See Cheng, supra note 34, at 1942-43; Yu, supra note 15, at 372.
63. See infra Part I.C.
64. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. How Does the United States Benefit from a "No" Vote for Permanent Normal
Trade Relations with China? Hearing on Permanent Normalized Trade Relations
with the People's Republic of China Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 106th Cong.
(2000) [hereinafter Valenti testimony] (testimony of Jack Valenti, President and
Chief Executive Officer, MPAA) (discussing the benefits of extending normal trade
relations with China).
66. Doug Nairne, Beijing's Phoney War on Fakes, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
July 23, 2004, at 15.
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Zhigang, one of China's vice ministers of commerce, announced
that China had seized "2 million compact discs during the first
half of the year in raids on 8,000 CD and software dealers
around the country, fining violators about $3.6 million."" One
particularly high profile case in Shanghai-the first joint
investigation by Chinese and U.S. authorities of DVD piracy-
resulted in the seizure of over 210,000 pirated DVDs and
$100,000 in cash, as well as the arrest of six people, including
two Americans.6 8 Although these examples are quite impres-
sive, piracy in China remains a significant problem, and the
United States has continued to criticize China's efforts to
combat it.69
2. Enforcement in Chinese courts
Copyright violation disputes may be tried in three of the
four Chinese judicial divisions authorized to handle IP related
claims: civil, criminal, or administrative courts." Litigation in
these courts has steadily increased.7 ' In 2003, three MPAA
67. Peter S. Goodman, Pirated Goods Swamp China: Official Crackdown has
Little Effect, WASH. POST, September 7, 2004, at El.
68. Michael Janofsky, 2 Americans Held in China on Charges of Film Piracy,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at B4. The arrests led to convictions. The Associated
Press, 2 Americans Sentenced in DVD Piracy in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04120/business/media/20piracy.html. One American
was fined $60,500 and sentenced to two and half years in prison; the other was fined
$1200 and sentenced to one year in prison. Id. They will be deported after serving
their sentences. Id. The court also convicted two Chinese accomplices involved in
the operation. Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, Americans
Accused of Stealing and Selling Movies Sentenced Today in China (Apr. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.mpaa.org/MPAAPress/2005/2005-04_19a.doc.
69. See infra Part I.C.3.
70. See Brent T. Yonehara, Enter The Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film
Piracy and Prospects for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
389, 396-97 (2002). In terms of IP violations, the fourth division of China's People's
Courts-economic courts--handles only economic contract cases resulting from
patent and trademark disputes. Id. IP trial courts at both the intermediate and
high court level exist in the major trade cities/provinces of Beijing, Shanghai,
Hainan, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Fujian. See generally Susan Finder, The
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through the Courts, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 255, 225, 260 (Mark A. Cohen et al.
eds., 1999). Additionally, as the highest court in China, the Supreme People's Court
is further authorized to hear appeals. Yonehara, supra note 70, at 396-97.
71. Between 1992 and 1997, China's IP courts adjudicated a total of 16,894 IP
cases. Finder, supra note 70, at 257-58. And, between 1997 and 2000, the number
of copyright suits accepted by courts jumped by 175% from 350 to 963. Graham J.
Chynoweth, Reality Bites: How the Biting Reality of Piracy in China is Working to
Strengthen its Copyright Laws, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 15 (2003).
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companies won a major lawsuit in Shanghai against two local
DVD companies that sold pirated versions of MPAA films.
2
Noting that the litigation marked the first time a foreign film
company sued local DVD sellers,73 the Shanghai intermediate
court based its ruling on the fact that U.S. companies enjoy
copyright protection of their films in China due to China's
signature to the Berne Convention. 4
3. U.S. Assessment of China's Enforcement Efforts
Over the last few years, the U.S. Congress has recognized
China's regulatory improvements and enforcement efforts.75 In
1996 the United States took China off the Special 301 list, but
has continued to monitor the country due to the serious intel-
lectual piracy problems that continue to plague U.S. companies
doing business in China.6 With regard to copyrights, Congress
noted crackdown efforts by relevant Chinese authorities, but
indicated that significant problems continued to exist. The
USTR reported that in 2003 at least 90% of virtually every type
of copyrighted work sold in China was counterfeit, causing
annual losses of over $1.8 billion to U.S. companies due to piracy
of copyrighted materials. 8
The U.S. Commercial Service echoed these comments in
their evaluation of China's efforts in 2004.' 9 The agency noted
China's enactment of several new IP laws, but remarked that
72. Da Yong, US Film Giants Win Lawsuit, CHINA DAILY (North America),
Aug. 8, 2003, at 3.
73. But see WANG, supra note 7, at 87 (citing cases the MPA brought in Chinese
courts against home video pirates as early as 1994).
74. Yong, supra note 72, at 3. In addition to awarding the U.S. film giants
more than $80,000 in damages, the court ordered the two Chinese DVD distributors
to issue a public apology and confession via the local Chinese language news media.
Id.
75. Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices, S. REP. No. 107-
53, at 28-29 (2002) (prepared by the U.S. Dept. of State).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 29. Congress noted that "retail software revenue lost to piracy was
estimated to total $1.1 billion at the end of 2000." Id. As for the motion picture
industry, even as Vice Minister Zhang Zhigang delivered his announcement on
China's success in cracking down on infringing goods, pirated copies of new and old
DVDs and CDs were being sold in shops and on sidewalks on the most prominent
intersections of China's cities. Goodman, supra note 67, at El.
78. China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring Hearing Before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 108th Cong. 136 (2004)
[hereinafter Smith Testimony] (testimony of Eric H. Smith, president, International
Intellectual Property Alliance); USTR 2004 Report, supra note 5, at 73.
79. China 2004 Commercial Guide, supra note 5, at 17-18.
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
"the Chinese Government has yet to enact effective enforcement
measures to address willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy, as required by TRIPS."s° Further, while China
had some success in closing down factories that produced DVDs
and other optical disks, "large markets continue[d] to openly sell
pirated and counterfeit products despite repeated U.S.
government requests to shut down and prosecute vendors
selling infringing goods." 1
The MPAA estimates that in 2003 it lost $175 million in
trade losses to China due to a combination of Chinese trade
barriers and piracy.82  The MPAA lists China's piracy rate-
95%-as among the highest in the world and the highest in the
Asian region.8 Between 1995 and 2000, MPAA's estimated
losses due to piracy in China averaged around $120 million per
year and increased dramatically to $160 million in 2001 with
the increased market for DVDs.' MPAA Executive Vice Presi-
dent and Washington General Counsel Fritz Attaway stated
that "[t]otal box office from all films in China declined 40% since
the advent of VCD and DVDs, as customers substituted buying
pirated copies of home entertainment for viewing at home in-
stead of going to the movies." 15  Film piracy is clearly a great
problem, but it is one of many the MPAA has encountered as it
has entered the Chinese market .
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id. at 18-19. In addition, there is evidence that pirates exported pirated
CDs, VCDs and DVDs out of the country. Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 137.
With more than $87 million dollars in counterfeit goods coming from China seized by
U.S. Customs authorities during 2004, "China has no equal either as a source of
counterfeit and pirated goods to the world or as a market in which fakes are
produced and sold locally." Submission of the International AntiCounterfeiting
Coalition, Inc. to the USTR: Special 301 Recommendations 11 (Feb. 11 2005),
http://www.iacc.org/2005-301.pdf [hereinafter IACC 2005 Special 301 Recom-
mendations]. UK Customs reported that "China's share of optical products seizures
catapulted from an almost insignificant half of one percent of all seizures in 2002 to
the third largest source of pirated optical discs in 2003"-and this was only a small
fraction of the pirated goods produced in China targeted at world markets. Attaway
Testimony, supra note 6, at 50.
82. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 47.
83. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 46, 47, 49, 50, 51; MPAA, Anti-piracy
statement, http'//www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/content.htm (last visted
Sept. 25, 2005).
84. WANG, supra note 7, at 78.
85. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 51.
86. See infra Part II. But see WANG, supra note 7, at 87 (noting that video
piracy has developed a market for some American films, including ROBOCOP 3 (Orion
Pictures 1993), which when released legitimately in China was extremely successful
due in part to the market created by counterfeit copies of ROBOCOP 1 (Orion Pictures
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II. CHINA'S MARKET ACCESS FOR FOREIGN FILMS
A. GOVERNMENT FRAMEWORK ON FOREIGN FILM DISTRIBUTION
Commentators have noted that "[tihe operation of the film
business in China is unlike that of any other country in the
world."87  Two major government bodies govern the media
industry: the State Administration of Radio, Film and
Television (SARFT), which regulates the film (theatrical
releasing and distribution), radio, and television sector, and the
Ministry of Culture, which monitors the home video import and
distribution business.s
1. Film (Theatrical) Distribution
Promulgated in 1981, the Film Import Measures89 gave the
state-run China Film Corporation exclusive rights to select,
import, and distribute foreign films in China.9 ° Beginning with
the import of The Fugitive9l in 1994, a proposal adopted by
SAFRT authorized the China Film Corporation to import and
distribute foreign films on a revenue-sharing basis.92 However,
prior to China's WTO accession, SARFT imposed a de facto
quota limiting the number of foreign films that could be distri-
1987) and ROBOCOP 2 (Orion Pictures 1990) that had been previously distributed by
pirates).
87. CHINESE FILM: THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 3 (George
Stephen Semsel ed., 1987)
88. Shujen Wang, Film (Optical Disk) Piracy in China, 3 (2003) Issue Paper
Prepared for SSRC Intellectual Property, Markets & Cultural Flows Workshop, Oct.
24-25, 2003, New York, http://www.ssrc.org/programs/ccit/publications/
shujen.wang.rtf.
89. Jin kou ying pian guan li ban fa AQJ * ,W [Imported Films
Administrative Measures] (promulgated by the Ministry of Culture and the General
Administration of Customs, approved by the State Council, Oct. 13, 1981) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Imported Films Administrative Measures] (detailing the provisions for
China's import of films and placing the same restrictions on films imported from
Hong Kong and Macau as those placed on films imported from foreign countries).
90. Imported Films Administrative Measures, supra note 89, art. 2; see Xiaowei
(Sherry) Yin, China Opening Up on Foreign Film Imports, CHINA DAILY (Hong
Kong), July 16, 2003, at 7.
91. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993).
92. Wang, supra note 88, at 3. Although MPAA members have generally
enjoyed a 50-50 box office receipts split with local distributors under the revenue-
sharing basis concept, in China they generally only receive 15% of the box office
receipts, with approximately 30% going to the China Film Corporation and the
remainder to the local film companies that handle distribution in their localities.
See Valenti Testimony, supra note 65, at 59.
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buted on a revenue-sharing basis to ten per year.
As part of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, China
agreed to double the revenue-sharing quota; it currently allows
for a maximum of twenty films to be imported annually.94 In
addition to raising the revenue-sharing quota, China's WTO
commitments also reduced the film import duty from nine to five
percent, and changed the method used to calculate the duty,
resulting in a substantially lower tariff rate.95 Before any of
these twenty films can be distributed in China, however, first
they must undergo a lengthy review and censorship process,
which results in a lengthy delayed release of the film in China-
often several months after the film has been released in the
United States and other countries. 6
In December 2001, to address concerns over the lack of
competition in film distribution and to break up the China Film
Group's monopoly, the Ministry of Culture and SARFT issued
amendments to the Film Import Measures calling for "the esta-
blishment of another Chinese film distribution giant."7  Less
than two years after the amendments, Chinese officials formally
announced the formation of another film distribution giant-
Huaxia Film Distribution Company (Huaxia)-to begin distri-
buting approximately half of the twenty revenue-sharing films
China imports annually.98
2. Home Video99 Distribution
China began officially importing American home videos in
1997. 100 Between 1997 and 2000, China's Ministry of Culture
approved the import of over 800 home video titles (averaging
93. See Yin, supra note 90; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 46 (2001),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports-Publications/2001/2001_NTE
_Report/asset-upload-file535_6560.pdf.
94. See Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, Motion Pictures,
Videos, Sound Recordings (Feb. 2, 2000), http://www.uschina.orgfpublic/wto/ustr/
generalfacts.html [hereinafter U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement].
95. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 53.
96. Wang, supra note 88, dt 4.
97. Yin, supra note 90.
98. See id. Huaxia's shareholders include the China Radio & Film Group (its
largest shareholder with a 20% stake), China Film Group, Shanghai Film Group,
Changchun Film Group, and a total of fifteen Chinese film producers and theater
circuits. Id.
99. As used in this Note, home video refers to video tapes, VCDs, and DVDs
released for home entertainment.
100. Wang, supra note 88, at 4.
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200 per year).01 Like films imported for theatrical release,
home videos also undergo a review and censorship process that,
while significantly faster than the process which reviews the
twenty annual theatrical releases, is still lengthy. 02 As part of
its WTO commitments, China lowered its tariffs on home videos
from 15% to 10%, and agreed to change the calculation method
as it had done for theatrical releases.
0 3
3. Other Venues of Market Access
In addition to increasing the annual number of foreign films
available in Chinese theaters, China's WTO commitments also
called for foreign participation in joint ventures to distribute
video and sound recordings as well as cinema ownership and
operation.' Effective January 1, 2004, the Provisional Rules on
Foreign Invested Cinemas' permitted foreign investors to hold
stakes of up to 49% in joint ventures for the renovation,
construction and operation of cinemas. °6 SARFT has also
issued a regulation that permits majority foreign ownership of
film technology joint ventures in specified provinces and cities,
and minority stakes of up to 49% in film production com-
panies. 1°'
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Valenti Testimony, supra note 65.
104. U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, supra note 94.
105. Wai shang tou zi dian ying yuan zhan xing gui ding AMR *F f A
[Provisional Rules on Foreign Invested Cinemas] (promulgated by the State
Administration of Radio, Film & Television, Nov. 11, 2003, approved by the Ministry
of Commerce and Ministry of Culture, Jan. 1, 2004) (P.R.C.).
106. See Yin, supra note 90. Although China only committed to allowing foreign
minority ownership in theater management, in October 2003, China approved
Warner Brothers International Theaters, Inc. to take a 51% controlling interest in
its joint venture with the Shanghai Cinema Group to build and operate ten cinemas.
Julie Walton, WTO: China Enters Year Three, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at
10, 14.
107. Dian ying zhi pian, fa xing, fang ying jing ying zi ge jin ru zhan xing gui
ding EJ-, A , . [Provisional Regulations on
Qualifications for Engaging in Film Production, Distribution, and Presentation]
(promulgated by the State Administration of Radio, Film & Television, Sept. 9, 2003,
effective Dec. 1, 2003) (P.R.C.) available at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/manage/
publishfile/35/1252.htm. In accordance with this regulation, Warner Bros. Pictures,
China Film Group, and Chinese privately-owned Hengdian Group have recently
been approved to form Warner China Film HG Corp.-China's first Sino-foreign film
production joint venture-which is authorized to develop, invest in, produce, market,
and distribute Chinese-language feature films, TV films, and animation. US-China
Business Council, CHINA MARKET INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 27, 2004,
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B. HOLLYWOOD'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHINA'S DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
Although China has increased the number of revenue-
sharing films to twenty per annum, the MPAA has complained
that this quota is still far too low. 108 According to the MPAA,
normal WTO interpretation is that the twenty film commitment
marks the "minimum" number of permissible film imports
rather than a "maximum" film quota, as it is interpreted by
Chinese authorities.'0 9 The twenty imported foreign films fall
far short of Chinese demand for foreign, primarily American,
films."0 Also frustrating for the MPAA is the fact that the man-
datory censorship process is two to three times longer than the
process in other Asian markets with similar censorship require-
ments.' In terms of distribution rights, while Huaxia may
provide some competition to the China Film Corporation, both
entities are fundamentally owned by the same State organs.12
This highly controlled government import and distribution
structure provides few opportunities for true competition and
"pays little attention to the commercial needs of a large and
hungry market."
113
In addition, China has periodically announced "blackout
periods," during which no foreign films may be screened."4 For
http://www.uschina.org.
108. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 52.
109. Id.
110. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6; Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the
Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 355, 364-
65 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (finding that China maintains an artificially
small market for foreign films to support its domestic film industry); Wang, supra
note 88, at 3-4; cf Gerardo Lara, The Piracy of American Films in China: Why the
U.S. Art Form Is Not Protected by Copyright Laws in the People's Republic of China,
2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 343, 357 (1998) (concluding that China deliberately
limits market access to American films in order to reap the benefits of piracy).
111. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6; cf. Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement In China: Trade Issues, Policies and Practices, 8 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63, 78 (1997) (commenting that China's censorship process
is based on a concern about cultural influences from Western countries). By way of
comparison, China typically takes fifteen to thirty days and sometimes longer to
finish its censorship process of films, while Korea takes on average seven to ten
days, Singapore generally takes about seven days, Taiwan takes five to seven days,
and Japan needs about seven days for a film to clear customs (i.e., Japan does not
impose the same kind of censorship review). Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at
52.
112. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 52.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 53.
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example, as summer blockbusters such as Spider-Man 2,115
Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban,"6 and Shrek 217 were
set to be released worldwide in July 2004, in May 2004 China
announced a "crackdown on bad influences" designed to lower
rising violent crime rates in its nation's youth and protect them
from China's embrace of commercialism."" As a result of the
blackout period, no foreign films were released in China during
July 2004 in an effort to "encourage more upright pursuits."1 9
Some speculate that the Chinese blackout periods are more an
effort to protect China's domestic releases than a policy choice to
"purify the screen."121
The MPAA argues that the combination of the twenty film
quota, the slow censorship process, the film distribution mono-
poly, the blackout periods, and the tariffs-which are not paid
by DVD pirates-has created a piracy market to satisfy Chinese
demand for U.S. films with which legitimate U.S. film comp-
121anies cannot legally or monetarily compete. Similarly, due to
the slow home-video censorship process and the small number of
retail outlets, legitimate copies of video tapes, VCDs, and DVDs
are typically sold several months after consumers have already
bought pirated versions sold upon original release. 22 When
given a choice, most Chinese choose the cheaper, newer title.2 3
Despite China's WTO membership, these trade barriers are per-
mitted due to a "cultural exception" in international trade.2 4
III. THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION TO MULTILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
The concept of a cultural exception to multilateral trade
agreements rests on the notion that there are certain products
which are "cultural" and because of their "cultural specificity"
and "unique status," and indeed their very existence, they
115. SPIDER-MAN 2 (Columbia Pictures 2004).
116. HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Columbia Pictures 2004).
117. SHREK 2 (DreamWorks Pictures 2004).
118. Shashank Bengali, China Cracking Down on 'Bad Influences' in
Entertainment, KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, Aug. 4, 2004.
119. Id. To the Chinese government's credit, official instructions also led to the
free opening of museums during that time. Id.
120. See id.
121. Attaway Testimony, supra note 6.
122. Wang, supra note 88, at 4-5; Attaway Testimony, supra note 6.
123. See Wang, supra note 88, at 4.
124. See infra Part III.
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should not be regulated according to the same trade liberali-
zation rules applied to other goods." 5 However, the cultural
exception does not currently have any formal legal status; that
is, the exception does not exist as such in any agreement or
treaty of the WTO. 26 However, during the final negotiations for
the establishment of the WTO, France and other countries ex-
pressed concern that some GATT rules-in particular most-
favored-nation and national treatment status-would destroy
cultural industries if applied to them. 27  Heated discussions
provided no resolution, but there is now a tacit understanding
that WTO trade liberalization rules do not apply to films and
audio-visual goods and services.2
As has been noted by many, "Hollywood started to dominate
125. See UNESCO Cultural Exception Definition, supra note 8.
126. See id.; John H. Barton, The International Video Industry: Principles for
Vertical Agreements and Integration, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTN'T. L.J. 67, 93 (2004)
(discussing that while Article IV of the GATT 1947 "included a provision on
cinematograph films... [and expressly permitted] screen quotas reserving time for
national films," WTO discussions failed to reach an agreement with respect to
audiovisual services); Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception:
Does It Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does It Affect Or Is It Affected
by the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTN'T. L.J. 281, 286-305 (1997)
(discussing the GATT exception to motion pictures, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) general exclusion to cultural works "to protect Canada from
losing its cultural identity from a massive influx of U.S. works, which the Canadian
public eagerly consumes" and the WTO Uruguay Round discussions and standstill
for cultural exceptions). See generally Chi Carmody, When "Cultural Identity Was
Not At Issue". Thinking About Canada-Certain Measures Considering Periodicals,
30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 231, 261-77 (1999) (discussing treatment of culture in
GATT and WTO decisions).
127. See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 126, at 297-304; Alan Riding,
Filmmakers Seek Protection From U.S. Dominance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at E3
(discussing France's "impressive victory" over Hollywood in the WTO negotiations);
UNESCO Cultural Exception Definition, supra note 8. Generally, the most-favored-
nation principle requires WTO members to treat all members equally, and with
some exceptions, a nation cannot grant a tariff or other trading preference to one
nation without giving it to all other countries. See Understanding the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2005). The principal of national treatment requires nations to provide the same
treatment to foreign products, services, or IP items once they have entered the
domestic market. See id. Proponents of a cultural exception argue that cultural
industries, and in particular film and audiovisual ones, survive due to import
restrictions and other support mechanisms that would be destroyed should the
industries be subject to most-favored-nation and national treatment requirements.
See UNESCO Cultural Exception Definition, supra note 8.
128. See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 126, at 301-04 (discussing the scope of
the United States and the European Union's "agreement to disagree" over GATT
rules being limited only to audiovisual services, and that while audiovisual works
are fully covered by the free trade provisions, the audiovisual sector is temporarily
excluded from WTO trade liberalization).
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the world cinema market in the 1920s." 29 Since then, France
and other foreign countries have supported measures to guard
against what they deem "American cultural invasion."' The
United States has consistently viewed such restrictions purely
on economic terms-essentially as barriers to free trade.3
Advocates for the existence of a cultural exception in
international trade agreements argue that normal trade liberal-
ization rules should not apply to cultural products, as they are
not "merely manufactured product[s], but rather an expression
of what is most profound in a people, in a nation-it is its his-
tory, its language, its very identity."132  Proponents further
argue that "film and television are crucial conveyors of cultural
express[ion]-in fact the most widely applied means of trans-
porting a nation's culture at the end of the twentieth century"-
and therefore protection, otherwise inapplicable, should be given
to a country's film industry.13 Cultural exception supporters do
not call for complete bans of the importation of foreign cultural
goods, but instead argue that trade rules should favor domestic
movie, television, and radio industries by subsidizing those
industries and by minimizing foreign competition through the
imposition of import quotas.
3 4
Critics of the cultural exception do not dismiss the impor-
tance of culture, nor do they argue that a nation should not take
any steps to promote its own domestic film industry.3 3 How-
ever, critics do argue that cultural exemptions are based on the
129. See id. at 287.
130. Thomas Bishop, France and the Need for Cultural Exception, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 187, 187-88 (1997).
131. See id. at 187-88.
132. Id. at 187 ("Each country, although it needs to be open to the cultures of
other lands, has a right-even a duty-to protect and develop its own culture. The
disappearance of one country's culture cannot be made up by another's gain; the
result would be an irretrievable loss for all humanity."); Joseph Devlin, Note,
Canada and International Trade in Culture: Beyond National Interests, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 177, 190 (2004) (stating that "cultural productions are rooted in the
culture that produces them").
133. Bishop, supra note 130, at 187.
134. Riding, supra note 127, at E3 (discussing the French and Canadian views
on cultural exceptions).
135. See id. (quoting MPAA President Jack Valenti's partial support for France's
subsidies as a method to protect French film and comparing France's success with
the failing industries in other countries); cf Carolyn Hyun-Kyung Kim, Building the
Korean Film Industry's Competitiveness: Abolish the Screen Quota and Subsidize the
Film Industry, 9 PAc. RIM L. & POLY J. 353 (2000) (discussing the failed application
of a quota system in Korea and other countries and promoting the use of subsidies to
increase the competitiveness of the domestic Korean film industry).
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false presumption that "cultural transmission is a one-way
street," and argue further that although American films have
benefited from globalization of the audiovisual sector, it is
unclear that this success has translated into "substantive homo-
genization and a respective diminution of cultural identity."
136
Hence, opponents argue that normal trade rules adequately
protect cultural interests, and that if all other industries are
negotiated through the WTO, a special exception should not be
made for films.
137
Because the TRIPS Agreement focuses on the "acquisition,
maintenance, and transfer of intellectual property rights, [and]
not on an author's right to exploit his work," it is unlikely that
the TRIPS Agreement will, by itself, defeat the cultural excep-
tion concept. 138 Cultural trade exceptions remain a point of con-
tention, but steps have been taken to formalize an agreement on
the issue and a Draft Cultural Convention 139 is currently being
organized by UNESCO. Although the focus of the Draft Cultural
Convention is the protection of culture and not IP rights, the
United States should stress China's rampant film piracy and
failure to enforce its TRIPS obligations in the treaty's nego-
tiations.
136. Frederick Scott Galt, The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the "Cultural
Exception" in the Multilateral Trading System: An Evolutionary Analysis of Cultural
Protection and Intervention in the Face of American Pop Culture's Hegemony, 3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 909, 918-22 (2004).
137. See id. See generally Riding, supra note 127.
138. See Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 126, at 305-06.
139. UNESCO, Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Protection of the
Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, U.N. Doc.
CLT/CPD/2004JCONF-201i2 (July 2004) [hereinafter Draft Cultural Convention]; see
Riding, supra note 8 (discussing the 2004-2005 negotiations regarding the Draft
Cultural Convention); UNESCO, Towards a Convention on the Protection of the
Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, http://portal.unesco.org/
culturelen/ev.php-URLID=11281&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=
201.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (discussing the development of the Draft
Cultural Convention).
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IV. DISCUSSION OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF CHINA'S IP
ENFORCEMENT AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.
FILMS
A. CHINA'S FAILURE TO ENFORCE IP RIGHTS CANNOT BE CURED
SOLELY THROUGH FUTURE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
1. China's Current Enforcement is Insufficient
China has taken major steps to increase IP protection, but
these efforts are still not producing real results. China is now a
member to all important international IP treaties and has both
enacted and amended related domestic legislation to conform its
own laws to international IP treaties and standards.14 ° As such,
the text of China's copyright laws and its WTO membership
would appear to provide adequate protection to the MPAA and
give the organization confidence as it markets films in China.
14 1
Enforcement, in contrast to China's formal legislative and
international obligations, is clearly another matter. 142 Pirated
DVDs are still readily available for sale throughout the country
in spite of China's copyright laws.143
[Tihe bottom line is that with piracy rates over 90 percent, China is
not in compliance with its TRIPS obligations under Articles 41 and 61
of the WTO agreement, TRIPS agreement. Put simply, the Chinese
enforcement system has failed to significantly lower piracy levels in
any significant way over the last few years.
Although litigation in Chinese IP courts and some notable
prosecutions of illicit DVD producers have increased, China's
current enforcement system fails to sufficiently deter pirates
wishing to profit from counterfeited DVDs and other optical
discs. 45
Simply copying one computer program, CD, VCD, or DVD
140. See supra notes 29, 30, 41, 42, 43, 57 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
144. Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 134. Article 41 provides, inter alia,
that member states are to ensure enforcement procedures that prevent infringement
and provide deterrents. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, art. 41. Article 61
provides that member states shall enact criminal procedures and penalties for
willful copyright piracy on a commercial scale which shall act as an effective
deterrent. Id. art. 61.
145. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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may lead to a profit of up to several hundred percent in China.
Unlike huge printing presses required to reproduce books, the
internet and DVD burners allow pirates to reproduce films
quickly and cheaply. This ease in copying allows pirates to set
up new factories almost overnight, immediately after one is shut
down. Moreover, the light weight and small size of DVDs allow
the media to be transported easily and undetected throughout
the country. Accordingly, when news of a major DVD
confiscation is announced, the confiscation is a "mere drop in the
bucket compared to what really passes through the market
place in China.
" 147
One sign that China is treating piracy more seriously was a
"nationwide campaign to stamp out illegal CD and DVD
production lines" announced by the Chinese government in the
summer of 2005.148 The National Office for Cracking Down on
Pornography and Piracy (one of the eight government agencies
responsible for the campaign) opened a hotline for informants to
report pirate factories and offered rewards of up to $36,232 for
each illegal production line reported.' 4' China previously con-
ducted similar campaigns, but the reward amount was
increased for the 2005 campaign.' 5°
Although the summer 2005 campaign was a positive step
forward, China still needs to increase measures to deter the sale
of pirated films. Increased deterrence could come from larger
fines for counterfeiting and China treating piracy as a true
criminal offense.'" Although IP cases may be heard in criminal
152
courts, in practice administrative enforcement offers a less
cumbersome enforcement option for China to deal with counter-
feiting and piracy.'53 The International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IIPA),54 has stated that "[n]o country in the world has
been able to deal significantly with high levels of piracy without
146. Cf Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 135.
147. Id.
148. U.S.-China Business Council, China Launches Campaign Against Illegal
CD/DVD Production Lines, Raises Tip Reward (June 29, 2005),
http://www.uschina.org (follow "China Market Intelligence" hyperlink).
149. Id.
150. Id. From 1994 to 2004, $4.82 million was paid out in rewards to informers
of pirated audio and video products. Id.
151. Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 135.
152. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
153. Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 135.
154. Id. ("The IIPA is a coalition of six trade associations representing the
copyright industries which has worked to strengthen copyright laws and
enforcement regimes in over 100 countries worldwide.").
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using its criminal law.. . [and until China does so, there will
not] be any significant change."155
China does need to increase penalties for copyright vio-
lations and make piracy more than a mere administrative
offense in order to bring its enforcement into conformity with its
international commitments. But as will be discussed below,
U.S. opportunities to bring about direct change in China's IP
enforcement practices are quite limited.
2. Negotiations Cannot Increase Enforcement Directly
A major force encouraging China to improve its IP legis-
lation and creating Chinese obligations to improve its IP
enforcement was the bilateral trade negotiations with, and
threats of trade wars from, the United States.156 Other than
some high profile cases, however, these U.S.-Chinese promises
have had little practical significance. 157 The passing of new
legislation will naturally take place more quickly than its actual
enforcement, but the multiple failed negotiations and weak
agreements demonstrate their ineffectiveness in achieving any
real change in the enforcement area.
In an attempt to protect the IP interests of the U.S. busi-
ness community, the USTR has carefully scrutinized China for
its IP violations and has stated that it intends "to continue to
use... all available mechanisms to press for further improve-
ment in China's IPR regime."5 ' Additionally, the International
AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Inc. (IACC)159 states that "current
trends suggest China will remain the world's worst violator of
intellectual property rights unless decisive action is taken to fix
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 26-32, 37-51, 55-58 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text; see also IACC 2005 Special
301 Recommendations, supra note 81, at 12-13.
158. See USTR, 2004 Special 301 Report Section 306 (May 3, 2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/SectionIndex.html
(click on "2004 USTR Reports and Publications" hyperlink; click on "2004 Special
301 Report" hyperlink; click on "2004 Special 301 Report Section 306" hyperlink);
USTR, Special 301 Q & A - 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/
eportsPublications/SectionIndex.html (click on "2003 USTR Reports and
Publications" hyperlink; click on "2003 Special 301 Report" hyperlink; click on
"Special 301 Q & A" hyperlink) [hereinafter USTR 301 Q&A]; see also supra note 76
and accompanying text.
159. The IACC is a multinational organization which represents the interest of
companies concerned with IP enforcement. IACC 2005 Special 301
Recommendations, supra note 81, at 2.
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the problem." 160 But while the IACC urges the Chinese govern-
ment to impose more severe penalties and clarify judicial inter-
pretations of its laws, and the USTR meets with China to
discuss violations of international obligations, effective change
will only come from a change in Chinese political will.
Even if previous negotiations with U.S. officials were con-
ducive to reforming China's IP regime when the United States
signed bilateral agreements with China from 1979 through the
mid-1990s, 161 the threat of trade sanctions today no longer
carries the same weight. With each of those agreements, China
had something to gain from international trade cooperation-
first renewed trade relations with the United States and other
Western countries, and then ultimately entry into the WTO.' 6 '
However, China's WTO entrance removed a huge bargaining
chip that the United States was able to use as leverage in its
negotiations with China to insist on significant legal reform. In
short, threatened trade sanctions are likely to have little effect
in the actual disappearance of counterfeit DVDs from China's
streets.
China's membership in the WTO now permits the United
States and other member states to use the WTO dispute settle-
ment system to resolve IP disputes between the two countries.
163
Settling disputes through the WTO must be handled through
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 6 1 While the DSB is an
attractive venue for settling some international trade disputes,
the potential time and burden of proof required to settle
disputes through the DSB makes it an uninviting arena in
160. Id. at 11.
161. See supra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 26, 37-40 and accompanying text.
163. The TRIPS Agreement is part of the undertaking WTO member states take
when they accede to the international trading body, meaning that that the TRIPS
Agreement applies to all WTO members and that the WTO's dispute resolution
system can be applied to TRIPS Agreement related disputes between member
states. See WTO, Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights) in the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
ratop.eltrips-e/tripfq e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
164. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The DSB is made up of all member
governments, usually represented by ambassadors or equivalent officials. Id. art. 2.
If two WTO member states cannot mutually resolve a dispute, they may request
that the DSB appoint a Panel, which will make a recommendation on the dispute
after hearing arguments from both sides. Id. art. 11. The panel's recommendation
will become the DSB's ruling on the dispute if it is not rejected by consensus. Id.
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which to solve U.S.-Chinese IP disputes.' The DSB exists more
to resolve disputes than to make rulings, and therefore many
cases are negotiated between countries for several years without
resolution. 66 In addition, the remedies available through a DSB
resolution are not very appealing. For example, the DSB might
issue a ruling requiring China to improve enforcement of its IP
legislation and particularly to adequately protect the IP rights
of American films. However, if China refused or was unable to
comply with the decision, the conventional penalty-imposing
trade sanctions-has proven ineffective in forcing China to
improve enforcement. 167 Moreover, the USTR has stated that it
prefers to settle matters "out of court" and views settling
disputes through the WTO DSB "as a tool of 'last resort." 68
China's WTO membership itself will arguably have a
positive effect on the continued development of China's IP
climate. Increased trade with other nations will result in better
economic conditions for Chinese citizens and foster a desire for
higher quality products. 69 On the other hand, WTO member-
ship will also improve access to Chinese markets, a condition
which may enhance the economic conditions that give rise to
piracy and counterfeiting. 7 0 Chinese pirates might also gain in-
creased access to international markets for counterfeit goods.'7 '
Assuming that WTO membership does increase IP law
enforcement, the change will not take place overnight. As such,
it is likely that the U.S. government, IP watchdogs, and the
MPAA will need to continue monitoring China's violations and
make recommendations to China on how to reform its IP regime
for some time.
3. Chinese Requests for Patience Are Not Completely
Ungrounded
Although China's IP legislation is still not as strong as it
should be, it is impressive how quickly China has joined inter-
national copyright conventions and enacted copyright legislation
165. Cf Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in
China, 11 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. 1, 31 (2002) (implying that it may
be difficult to prove aspects of China's piracy problem before the DSB).
166. See DSU, supra note 164, art. 3.
167. See id. art. 22; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
168. See USTR 301 Q&A, supra note 158.
169. See Yu, supra note 165, at 30-31.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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to conform, albeit generally, to its international commitments. 72
The changes within the last thirty years are even more im-
pressive when viewed against a historical and cultural back-
ground that is best described as antithetical to the concept of
copyright law. 173 Further, since enforcement involves educating
judges, law enforcement officers, and the public generally, it is
natural that strong enforcement of the new legislation will
require some additional time. Therefore, China's argument that
time is required to develop adequate copyright enforcement is
not completely unfounded.
174
It is worth noting that while the United States has the
benefit of a longer history of copyright laws and a greater appre-
ciation of their importance, movie piracy exists on the internet
and streets of the United States as well, and is also a great con-
cern to the film industry. 175 Theft is universally frowned upon,
but technological advances have created a "perception that
freely downloading copyrighted works is something other than
theft" by consumers in the United States. 76 MPAA President
and Chief Executive Dan Glickman stated that "[p]eople knew
they couldn't steal a video tape out of Blockbuster... but the
principles [when downloading a pirated version of a film] are
still the same."77 As big a concern as this is in the United
States, it will be a growing concern in coming years in China as
well. In addition to the open sale of pirated DVDs, internet
piracy of films is already becoming a larger problem in China,
which is reported to have the second largest number of internet
users in the world.
178
Realistically identifying the difficulty of affecting positive
enforcement change in China is not to suggest that the MPAA or
U.S. authorities should sit idly by while pirated DVD copies of
American films are sold openly on Chinese streets. The resis-
tance to increased IP enforcement in China does, however,
suggest that the problems of counterfeit DVDs and internet
piracy are likely to exist in China for some time, even if China
does increase fines for IP violations and treat piracy more
seriously.
172. See supra notes 30, 41, 42, 58, 144 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
175. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
176. Zeller, supra note 2.
177. Id.
178. See Smith Testimony, supra note 78, at 137.
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4. Although Results Will be Limited, Self-Help and Direct Action
by MPAA Companies in China Will Continue to be Effective
Under China's Current Enforcement Regime
While the U.S. government should continue to pressure
China to improve its IP enforcement, American film companies
and U.S. authorities must also continue to file lawsuits in
Chinese courts and work together directly with Chinese authori-
ties to prosecute copyright violations."9  Although full-scale
piracy investigations are costly and may not always result in
huge victories, the investigations serve two purposes: (1) they
punish the actual violator and may even result in the recovery
of some of the ill-gained profits acquired through illegal sales of
the copyrighted works, and (2) they make the Chinese (and non-
Chinese) public more aware of the importance of copyrights.
The 2004 international counterfeit DVD ring bust in
Shanghai, conducted jointly by U.S. Customs and Chinese
authorities, highlights the success that can be achieved when
U.S. authorities work directly with the Chinese government in
China.'80 The MPAA viewed the bust as a major step toward
China fulfilling its IP commitments. 8' However, U.S. author-
ities only discovered the piracy operation due to statements
posted on a foreign website by an American participating in the
ring. 1 2 Had the counterfeit DVD ring not been exporting DVDs
out of China, and had the individual not boasted of his income
over the internet, it is unlikely he would have attracted the
attention of U.S. authorities. The blatancy of the participants'
actions was not only instrumental in their arrest, but is
indicative of Chinese pirates' perception of the law. Due to
China's low level of enforcement, many pirates believe they can
violate Chinese copyright law with impunity. Given the
clandestine nature of most DVD piracy operations, and their
ability to move their production lines quickly, the vast majority
179. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
181. See Janofsky, supra note 68 (quoting then President and Chief Executive of
MPAA Jack Valenti that the raid was "unprecedented" and "a very crucial step in
redeeming" the promise of China Vice Premier Wu Yi to significantly reduce piracy
by the end of the year).
182. Id. One of the two Americans seized in the case had "described himself in
great length in a profile on a website for men seeking brides from Russia." Id. He
stated that he had "moved to China in 1995" because he "thought it would be an
interesting place to live with many business opportunities." Id. He further described
his gross sales of pirated DVDs from his website in Shanghai as "about $25,000 per
month" and that he had "10 full-time employees." Id.
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of counterfeiters readily evade the radar of most U.S.
investigations.""
It is also doubtful whether Chinese authorities would have
welcomed such intricate U.S. involvement in the case had
American citizens not been actively participating in the counter-
feit ring. Nonetheless, the summer 2004 bust does provide a
good model for partnership in combating piracy of U.S. films. It
also suggests that when DVD rings do involve a foreign element,
Chinese authorities may be more open to cooperation with U.S.
authorities.
5. Partnership With Domestic Film Industries May be a Partial
Solution
As China's domestic music and movie industries develop
and begin to lose greater profits on account of copyright
violations, China will likely do more to enforce its IP commit-
ments. One indication that the Chinese government is taking
the issue of piracy against domestic audiovisual industries more
seriously is China's invitation to more than one hundred enter-
tainers, including twenty from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan,
to take part in a concert on February 26, 2005 to promote an
anti-piracy campaign. 184 "The concert [was] designed to raise
anti-piracy awareness among the general public," and it was the
"first time [China's] central government held such an event to
protect intellectual property rights." 8' Proceeds from the
concert benefited a national anti-piracy fund set aside by the
China Audio-Video Association for its efforts to combat counter-
feiting.1
8 6
China's laws currently limit foreign ownership in film pro-
duction companies to minority interests.8 7 As American film
companies partner with their Chinese counterparts, however,
the copyright interests the MPAA seeks to protect will be those
183. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
184. See Cui Ning, Pop Stars to Sing Out Against Pirate Music, CHINA DAILY
(North America), Feb. 15, 2005, at 1.
185. Id. (quoting Liu Jie, Deputy Director of the copyright department of the
National Copyright Administration).
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. Despite being restricted
to minority ownership, a clear advantage of establishing a joint venture to produce
films in China is that its films would not be restricted by the country's annual quota
of twenty foreign films. David Barboza, Hollywood Movie Studios See the Chinese
Film Market as Their Next Rising Star, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at C3.
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of a Chinese company. As such, the Chinese government will
have an increased interest in their protection. As shown by the
February 2005 concert, the cooperation will allow for greater
opportunities to educate the public about copyrights and provide
greater funds to fuel anti-piracy efforts.
6. Piracy Cannot be Eliminated Without Improved Market
Access
Increased penalties and raids will only have a limited effect
as long as market access restrictions remain high on American
films in China.8 ' The ease with which DVDs can be reproduced,
coupled with the time required for copyright law to gain
legitimacy, creates an atmosphere highly conducive for those
wishing to make a profit by meeting the demand created by the
limited availability of high-quality American films. Therefore, if
the MPAA seeks to make serious inroads in combating piracy in
China, it must find a way to have more films distributed
legally.'89
B. REEVALUATION OF THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION AND RELATED
MARKET ACCESS ISSUES IN LIGHT OF CHINA'S PIRACY PROBLEM
1. The Cultural Exception, Generally
It is a reasonable proposition that cultural products should
188. See supra notes 87-122 and accompanying text.
189. Some companies have begun to experiment with alternative strategies to
combat piracy of their films in China. In summer 2005, Warner Bros. released THE
SISTERHOOD OF THE TRAVELING PANTS (Warner Bros. 2005) on DVD in China on the
same day it debuted in U.S. theaters. Jon Healey, Warner Gets a Jump on Film
Pirates in China, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at Al. In order to make unauthorized
copies of the legitimately released DVD less appealing to counterfeiters located both
in and outside China, the DVD was released in China without any special features
and with "Mandarin subtitles that cannot be hidden." Id. Given that THE
SISTERHOOD OF THE TRAVELING PANTS was "a relatively low-budget film that the
studio had not planned on releasing in Chinese theaters," the move was mainly
intended to "provide some insights into the market," and Warner Bros. has no
immediate plans "to apply the same strategy to combat bootlegging in the U.S. or
other countries," or "with more high-profile titles." Id. Sony Pictures previously
tried a similar strategy by releasing "deeply discounted" DVDs of the Chinese-made
film KUNG Fu HUSTLE (Sony Pictures 2004) in China just forty-five days after it was
released in Chinese theaters. Id. Sony did not release the film in U.S. theaters
until two months later. Id.
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be treated differently in international trade from other goods.9 °
Assuming that cultural products truly contain that which is
"most profound in a people," then a cultural product simply
cannot be treated the same as a "manufactured product." 9'
Trade liberalization is based on a theory of comparative advan-
tage, which provides that a nation should manufacture the
goods that it is most efficient in producing compared to other
goods, and then trade with other nations to obtain the goods
that it produces less efficiently.' 9 If this theory were to be
applied to cultural products, the cultural industries and
traditions of many nations might disappear, which would be a
loss for all nations.9
Therefore, in order to protect a nation's cultural industries
from disappearing, it logically follows that the WTO trading
rules of most-favored-nation and national treatment should be
relaxed with respect to cultural products. 94 Accordingly, a
nation should be able to provide some special treatment to its
own domestic film industry or to that of another country if it
wishes to ensure its continued existence. 19' While the preser-
vation of cultural products is good in theory, if no limits are
placed on how a nation is allowed to benefit from the exception,
it also follows that the nation could prohibit the free and open
exchange of ideas, knowledge, and culture, which would be no
less of a loss for all nations."6
The issue of pirated DVDs in China highlights the problems
created by a nation that is too restrictive in protecting the exis-
tence of its own film industry. When a nation restricts legal
importation of foreign films, the restriction must be balanced
against the ability of the nation's citizens to obtain the film
190. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; cf. Devlin, supra note 132, at
189-90 (noting that "interchangeability is noticeably absent in cultural production").
192. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 7-14 (4th ed. 2002).
193. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
195. But cf Devlin, supra note 132, at 197 ("Although the nation-state is not an
entirely trustworthy advocate for the preservation of commercially vulnerable
culture in world trade, it is the only stakeholder that has standing in relation to the
WTO.").
196. Riding, supra note 8 (quoting the American response to the Draft Cultural
Convention: "Mounting trade barriers, including efforts to prevent the free flow of
investment and knowledge, is not a valid way to promote cultural liberty or diversity
since such measures reduce choices."); see supra notes 136-137 and accompanying
text.
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through unlicensed channels, including pirate DVD networks
and the internet. China's current ability to set extremely low
quotas on the number of foreign films that can be legally
imported annually has created and strengthened its market for
pirated DVDs.' 97 As access to digital technologies and the
internet grows, border inspections may become "increasingly
difficult and even futile" in preventing the free flow of cultural
products and a cultural exception may seem less meaningful. 198
Given the importance France, Canada, China, and other coun-
tries place on the protection of cultural industries, however, the
existence of cultural exceptions will be a long-term issue.
The current United States-European Union "agreement to
disagree" on cultural exemptions in the WTO has created a de
facto cultural exception that is more problematic than a formal
exception. The unstated agreement does not provide any guide-
lines on the limits to measures which a nation can take in
seeking to protect "cultural products."200 The conclusion of a for-
mal treaty governing trade in cultural products could provide
formal guidelines to address the problems created by China's
highly protective environment. The lack of set guidelines pro-
vides too little transparency and predictability for movie pro-
ducers and allows countries to discriminate against foreign films
simply because they are cultural products. A formal agreement
could address these issues and at the same time ensure that
cultural products are adequately protected.
The Draft Cultural Convention is a proposed instrument
that would formally establish a cultural exception.20' The draft
was presented by fifteen culture experts in the summer of 2004
and attempted to address concerns of both the United States
and cultural exception supporters "by endorsing 'the free flow of
ideas by word and image' and by noting that cultural goods and
services 'must not be treated as ordinary merchandise or con-
sumer goods.' °0 The United States has objected to "anything
that prevents the free and open exchange of" cultural products
in the Draft Cultural Convention, while supporters of the Con-
vention have argued that the instrument would promote the
197. See supra notes 85, 93, 94, 105-07 and accompanying text.
198. See Devlin, supra note 132, at 188.
199. See Riding, supra note 8; supra notes 126, 128, 139 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 139.
202. Riding, supra note 8.
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availability and choice of different cultural products. 3
Debate on amendments to the Draft Cultural Convention is
likely to exist for the near future.2 4 Various countries and
international organizations, including WIPO, have commented
on the Draft Cultural Convention, but as of the date of this Note
many commentators' concerns have not yet been incorporated
into the text of the Convention.0 5 Given that the Convention's
goal is to protect "the diversity of cultural contents and artistic
expressions and that it was drafted by culture experts, its
treatment of the IP issues involved is minimal.0 7 The original
July 2004 text of the Draft Cultural Convention did provide:
Article 7 - Obligation to promote diversity of cultural expression
2. States Parties shall also ensure:
(a) that the legal and social status of artists and creators is fully
recognized, in conformity with international existing instruments, so
that their central role in nurturing the diversity of cultural
expressions is enhanced;
(b) that intellectual property rights are fully respected and enforced
according to existing international instruments, particularl, through
the development or strengthening of measures against piracy.
The authors of the July 2004 text of the Draft Cultural
Convention also provided two options describing how the
Convention might function with existing IP laws and treaties to
which member states are parties:
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Office of the Spokeswoman of UNESCO, Second Session of the
Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts on the Preliminary Draft on the Protection of
the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions (Jan. 31-Feb. 12, 2005),
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=13486&URLDO=DOTOPIC&
URLSECTION=201.html. UNESCO has begun to incorporate some government
suggestions into the Draft Cultural Convention. See generally UNESCO,
Preliminary Report by the Director-General Setting Out the Situation to be Regulated
and the Possible Scope of the Regulating Action Proposed, Accompanied by the
Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural
Contents and Artistic Expressions, U.N. Doc. 33 C/23 (Aug. 4, 2005) (hereinafter
Cultural Committee Second Session). The analysis in this Note refers solely to the
original July 2004 text of the Draft Cultural Convention.
206. Cultural Convention Second Session, supra note 205.
207. The so-called "cultural experts" who drafted the text of the Draft Cultural
Convention are government representatives nominated by UNESCO member states.
See id.
208. Draft Cultural Convention, supra note 139, art. 7 (emphasis added).
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Article 19 - Relationship to other instruments
Option A
1. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting the
rights and obligations of the States Parties under any existing
international instrument relating to intellectual property rights to
which they are parties,
2. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and
obligations of any State Party deriving from any existing international
instrument, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations
would cause serious damage or threat to the diversity of cultural
expressions.
Option B
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights and obligations of
the States Parties under any other existing international
instruments.
20 9
While proposed articles 7 and 19 require that member
states uphold their external IP commitments, the broad
language of proposed article 6 of the original July 2004 draft
called into question whether a country could adequately fulfill
those commitments:
Article 6 - Rights of States Parties at the national level
1. Within the framework of its cultural policies as defined in Article
4.7, and taking into account its own particular circumstances and
needs, each State Party may adopt measures, especially regulatory and
financial measures, aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of
cultural expressions within its territory, particularly in cases where
such expressions are threatened or in a situation of vulnerability.
2. Such measures may include the following:
(a) measures which in an appropriate manner reserve a certain space
for domestic cultural goods and services among all those available
within the national territory, in order to ensure opportunities for their
production, distribution, dissemination and consumption, and include,
where appropriate, provisions relating to the language used for the
above-mentioned goods and services;
(b) measures which guarantee independent cultural industries effective
access to the means of producing, disseminating and distributing
cultural goods and services;
209. Id. art. 19.
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(c) measures which grant public financial aid; in granting such aid,
States Parties may determine the nature, amount and beneficiaries
thereof;
(d) measures which promote the free exchange and circulation of ideas,
cultural expressions, and cultural goods and services, encourage non-
profit organizations, and stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit;
(e) measures which encourage and support public service
institutions.
2 10
As with the current de facto cultural exception, these pro-
visions are troubling as they do not provide any guidelines on
the limits to measures which a country could take in seeking to
protect its own cultural products. That is, this provision would
continue to allow China to set unreasonably restrictive quotas
on the import of foreign films, which has been a major factor in
the development of China's pirated DVD market. The re-
mainder of this note will highlight the inadequacy of the status
quo in terms of allowing a country such as China to continue to
have no restrictions in limiting legal access to foreign audio-
visual works. The remainder will also describe how the Draft
Cultural Convention could be amended to better protect the IP
rights of producers of American films in China.
2. The Cultural Exception's Problems as Applied to China
a. China's Quotas Need to be Reduced
In response to its commitments in the U.S.-China Bilateral
WTO Agreement, China doubled the number of foreign films it
allows to be shown in Chinese theaters.21' Yet the current for-
eign film quota is still extremely limited given the great demand
for foreign films in the Chinese market.212 Whether the quota is
considered in purely economic terms or as a good faith effort to
protect against American homogenization of the international
film industry, as with screen quotas imposed by other nations,
the Chinese authorities state that the quotas are necessary to
protect the vitality of Chinese film makers and Chinese
culture.212
210. Id. art. 6 (emphasis added).
211. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 110, 120, 129-31 and accompanying text.
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The number of Chinese multiplex theaters with state-of-
the-art equipment will increase as new laws permitting
increased foreign ownership in theaters take hold, but currently
many theaters can show only a limited number of films at
once. 211 Chinese supporters of the quota argue that without im-
posing quotas on foreign films, the demand for American films
would require that Chinese theater owners show fewer Chinese
films, and as a result the Chinese film industry would be severe-
ly damaged.215 China is not the only nation that claims quotas
are required to protect the livelihood of its domestic film indus-
216try. Nevertheless, the widespread existence of pirated DVDs
ultimately undermines at least some of the goals cultural
protection is designed to achieve through the use of quotas.
Unlike the Chinese authorities who prohibited foreign films
to be shown in order to purify the screen during the summer of
2004, most advocates of a cultural exception do not fear the
negative moral and cultural influences contained in imported
films. 217  Proponents instead view the quotas as a measure
designed to ensure the economic viability of the domestic film
makers and indirectly preserve the domestic culture of the
people.18
The extensive proliferation of pirated DVDs arguably de-
feats this goal. While quotas do make fewer foreign films avail-
able to consumers and allow more ticket money to be directed
toward domestic film companies, even quotas offer no assurance
that domestic film makers will continue to produce truly
domestic cultural products. Domestic film makers may be
influenced directly by any Western films they view, pirated or
otherwise. Chinese movie producers may also sense a domestic
demand for Hollywood-style movies and seek to emulate Holly-
wood films in order to make a profit rather than make "Chinese"
films. Therefore, although Western cultural influence may be
tempered by the direct restriction on American films, it may be
the inevitable result of cultural producers attempting to profit
off of what they know is in demand. In other words, it is not at
all obvious that market access restrictions protect the existence
of "true" Chinese films.
Additionally, it is questionable how successful quotas are as
214. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 118-20, 129-31 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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a direct means to protect the general populace from being domi-
nated by American culture. Rather than paying an exorbitant
amount of money to buy one ticket to have one's culture poi-
soned by foreign influences in a theater, instead the cheap
prices of pirated DVDs allow Chinese citizens to buy, own,
watch, and be poisoned by even more foreign movies. As such,
quotas do not prohibit Chinese citizens from watching foreign
films, but only from watching them legally. Ironically, the low
price of DVDs combined with the inability to see the films in
domestic theaters increases the Chinese citizenry's knowledge of
American life (as viewed through Hollywood blockbusters), and
at the same time tacitly encourages continued delay in the
appreciation for copyright law.
Therefore, whether quotas are designed to protect Chinese
citizens directly from the adverse effects of exposure to foreign
films or protect the livelihood of the domestic film industry, the
rampant spread of extremely cheap DVDs inhibits the achieve-
ment of both goals. The Draft Cultural Convention should
therefore be amended to prohibit the use of such restrictive
quotas. If quotas are to be permitted at all, they must factor
into account the effects of digital and other technologies that
facilitate widespread viewing of films despite official import
restrictions. Under China's current system, its highly restric-
tive movie quotas create incentives for Chinese consumers to
watch pirated DVDs and help the counterfeit industry to
flourish. Accordingly, the quotas should be set high enough that
consumers are encouraged to watch foreign films legally rather
than purchase pirated copies of DVDs. If the Draft Cultural
Convention endorsed a higher quota system, China would bene-
fit by being able to reserve room for domestically produced films
in its theaters, not having to renegotiate the issue individually
with foreign countries, and potentially having its IP enforce-
ment increased.
Alternatively, rather than permit strict quotas on the
number of foreign film imports as China currently does, the
Draft Cultural Convention could establish that only screen time
quotas are permissible.219 Under a screen time quota system, a
country could be permitted to reserve a minimum amount of
219. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. See generally Ivan Bernier,
Local Content Requirements for Film, Radio, and Television as a Means of
Protecting Cultural Diversity: Theory and Reality, http:/www.mcc.gouv.qc.ca/
internationalldiversite-culturelle/eng/update.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005)
(discussing the screen time allocation quotas of various countries).
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time during which theaters are required to show domestic films.
As screen time quotas do not limit the number of foreign films
that are actually imported and shown, they ensure that dom-
estic works receive a minimum amount of screen time and
simultaneously allow for increased cultural exchange. Ulti-
mately, however, the best solution would be for the Draft
Cultural Convention to only permit the use of subsidies to
benefit domestic film producers, even if those subsidies were
based on duties charged on the import of foreign films.22° Such a
system would allow countries like China to ensure that domestic
films are being produced even in the face of competition from
Hollywood films. The use of subsidies would also allow more
foreign films to be shown legally in China and may indirectly
increase respect for copyright law in China.
b. China's Blackout Periods Need to be Eliminated, or at Least
Reduced
China's periodic blackout periods completely restricting the
import of foreign films fail, like quotas, to protect the cultural
heritage of China's film industry. In order to combat piracy in
both the United States and abroad, American film makers now
release films in theaters worldwide at approximately the same
time. 2 ' The concept is simple. If a consumer can see the newest
Hollywood blockbuster in a theater with a huge screen, stadium
seating and great sound, without having to wait several months,
the consumer is less likely to download a pirated, poor quality
version of the film from the internet. Given the wide
availability of pirated DVDs of American films in China, as well
as Chinese citizens' access to the internet, American film
producers have an extra incentive to ensure that their films are
shown in Chinese theaters in a timely fashion. 2
Not surprisingly, China's occasional blackout periods are
extremely troublesome to American film makers 223 During the
busy 2004 summer season, as schools let out for vacation and
MPAA film companies released new movies worldwide, the
Chinese government banned all foreign movies in its theaters
claiming the Chinese government needed to protect its youth.24
220. See supra notes 132, 135 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 85, 178 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
20061
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
If the ban truly denied Chinese youth all access to the harmful
American cultural missiles, then one could take the measure
more seriously. 25 But while the ban undoubtedly prevented
some Chinese youth from being corrupted, many young con-
sumers watched the long-awaited American blockbusters on
pirated DVDs.22' After the blackout period ended and the films
were allowed in theaters, those who had watched the films ille-
gally had little incentive to pay higher prices to watch them
again. Because of the widespread availability of pirated movies
in China, the blackouts ultimately fail to prevent an influx of
American culture.
The Draft Cultural Convention should be amended to pro-
hibit blackout periods altogether. A USTR argument to this
effect would be helpful, but would not have the same strength as
a blackout prohibition included in a binding international agree-
ment. While screen time quotas may be a tolerable compromise
permitting a minimum screening percentage of domestic films,
complete bans on all foreign films over extended periods of
time-especially during well known busy periods-are plainly
protectionist.
c. China's Censorship Delays Must be Improved
Although pre-release censorship is not directly covered by
cultural exception discussions, censorship raises many of the
same concerns as blackout periods and quotas. The concept of
censorship has an ugly connotation to those who hold the free-
doms of speech and expression as essential in a free democracy.
At the same time, however, Americans understand that these
freedoms are not absolute. There are certain subjects, such as
child pornography, which should be censored in order to protect
what we consider to be higher values. Because not all countries
share the same cultural values, it is natural that different
governments and populations will have different ideas about
225. See supra notes 119, 120 and accompanying text.
226. To the Chinese government's credit, shortly before SHREK 2 was to be
legally released on DVD and VCD in China on November 5, 2005, the National
Copyright Administration called for a crackdown on pirated copies of SHREK 2 DVDs
in response to a complaint from Dreamworks SKG that pirated copies were being
sold in some Chinese shops and by street peddlers. See Cui Ning, Cracking Down
Pirated Shrek 2 DVD, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 21, 2004. The crackdown called for the
confiscation of any SHREK 2 DVDs sold prior to November 5 and threatened
penalties for any companies that attempted to "sell or produce illegal copies." Id.
Given that the majority of the damage was done over the summer, however, this
crackdown likely brought limited relief.
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which subjects should censored. Although American directors
and actors are undoubtedly unhappy when their cultural pro-
ducts are edited to meet foreign moral standards, the MPAA has
generally accepted this censorship as an unavoidable trans-
action cost of doing global business.
Even while censorship itself may be an acceptable cost of
doing business in a foreign market, the MPAA is correct to insist
on a quick and efficient censorship process. Most other Asian
countries accomplish the process in a fraction of the thirty-day
time period Chinese censorship typically requires.228 As with
China's quotas on foreign films and blackout periods, the conti-
nued proliferation of pirated DVDs creates urgency on the part
of American film makers to have their films clear China's
censorship process as quickly as possible. China's censorship
process for both home videos and theatrical release of films is
extremely slow, often leading to significant delays in the release
of films and videos.229 While a film or home video is waiting to
clear China's censors, pirated DVDs of the uncensored version of
the film are easily purchased.2 0
Speeding up the censorship process would not alleviate all
of the concerns created by the availability of pirated versions of
the films. Consumers may still purchase the pirated version
simply because it is not censored and they want to enjoy the
entire uncensored work. But the censored legitimate copy also
comes with quality assurances and other perks, including the
advantage of being able to view the film in a theater, an ad-
vantage not available with the pirated copy. Therefore, China
should speed up the censorship process both in order to protect
American film makers from losses related to IP rights violations
and in order to protect Chinese citizens from viewing the uncen-
sored, "harmful" portions of the films. While this internal
reason to expedite the censorship process does exist, an external
pressure could come from provisions in an international treaty.
The Draft Cultural Convention could specify maximum time
periods in which censorship is required to take place following
the importation of an audiovisual work.
227. See supra notes 96, 111 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 96, 102, 111 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
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d. Tariffs Should be Lowered and Phased Out, But are Likely to
Remain for the Near Future
In addition to dealing with the quota system, blackout
periods and censorship process, American film makers are also
forced to pay tariffs for the films they import into China
legally.2 1  China did lower these tariffs as part of its WTO
accession commitments,2 2 but it goes without saying that the
cost of these tariffs is borne entirely by foreign film companies.
Counterfeiters pay no duties when they import and sell films
that are either legitimately or illegitimately available in the
country. Chinese IP laws do impose fines on offenders, but the
low risk of getting caught and low cost required for large profits
continue to make the sale of pirated DVDs an attractive option
for many in China.233
While tariffs on foreign films clearly impose an unfair
burden on those seeking to legitimately import films to China,
the continued existence of a cultural exception is likely to allow
for the continued existence of high tariffs. Still, the extra-
ordinarily high level of piracy in China should be an effective
bargaining chip with which to call for a reduction in film tariffs,
either in bilateral negotiations or if the United States decides to
address the issue through the WTO's DSB or a dispute settle-
ment body created by a cultural convention.3 If the Draft
Cultural Convention is enacted, it should deal specifically with
tariffs on film imports and describe how a dispute settlement
body would effectively balance TRIPS violations against the
tariffs.
e. Liberalization of China's Film Importation and Distribution
Monopoly is Required
China's creation of Huaxia, a second film distribution giant
to compete with the China Film Corporation, marginally added
competition to China's foreign film distribution industry.23 5
However, because both Huaxia and the China Film Corporation
231. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
232. See Attaway Testimony, supra note 6, at 53; supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. If enacted, the Draft
Cultural Convention would exist separately from the WTO agreements and would
require its own dispute settlement body, as currently proposed in the text of the
Convention. See Draft Cultural Convention, supra note 139, art. 24.
235. See supra notes 97-98, 112-13 and accompanying text.
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are essentially owned by the same Chinese government bodies,
it is unlikely this competition serves the needs of the market
sufficiently. 36 China has enacted legislation and approved Sino-
foreign joint ventures in the areas of theater building, filmtecholog andfilm J.237
technology and film production. Foreign ownership is
currently limited to a minority interest in film product joint
ventures, but the foreign ownership group is authorized to
handle the distribution and marketing of its own films.
2 8
China will likely maintain strict control of the importation
of foreign films in the near future. But if import quotas are
lifted, the China Film Corporation and Huaxia may not be able
to handle the volume of films imported, and China would likely
liberalize this sector out of necessity. If laws are enacted
allowing for foreign ownership of distribution companies, MPAA
companies may wish to consider working together with pirates.
After all, the counterfeiters know the market well and have
already established their own distribution networks. Any move
to do so, however, should be approached with due diligence and
continued self-policing so as to ensure the American film com-
pany would not be simply supplying the counterfeiter with
better quality merchandise which he could then continue to
pirate on the side.
CONCLUSION
China has come a long way in developing its IP legislation
and enforcement. Nonetheless, rampant DVD piracy through-
out the country indicates there is much to be done and that com-
bating the counterfeiting problem will likely be a huge cost of
doing business for the American film industry in the future.
Compounding the piracy problem are China's huge market
access restrictions for American films that are permitted to
protect against cultural homogeneity. The widespread avail-
ability of foreign films through counterfeit networks, however,
prevents the cultural exception from truly protecting Chinese
culture from outside influence.
The annual losses suffered by the American motion picture
industry due to piracy and trade restrictions in China must take
into consideration that one reason pirated DVDs sell so well is
236. See supra notes 98, 112-13 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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simply because they are so much less expensive than going to
the theater or buying legitimate copies of the DVDs. Basic
economics teaches us that given two equal products, people will
pick the cheaper one. And China's piracy problem is not limited
to counterfeit DVDs. Counterfeit handbags, watches, shirts,
and many other goods that are not subject to such strict import
quotas are still produced and sold throughout China. 2 9 There-
fore, even if quotas, blackout periods, tariffs, and censorship
were all removed and the distribution monopoly was liberalized,
DVD piracy would likely continue to exist for the immediate
future.
Still, China's market access restrictions prevent MPAA
companies and other foreign film producers from having any
meaningful competition with the pirates. Therefore, the cul-
tural exception to free trade must be reconsidered in light of
new technologies and rampant piracy. Conditions must be
placed on the use of the doctrine to balance the competing
interests of blindly protecting culture and protecting IP rights.
The current tacit understanding that cultural goods are simply
not covered by other WTO agreements is simply an insufficient
method to protect both the cultural integrity of China's domestic
film industry and the IP rights of American films entering
China.
The creation of a formal agreement specifically covering
trade in cultural goods may be an effective method to address
both of these issues. Cultural goods would be seen as distinct
goods that need to be considered separately from other goods
when engaging in foreign trade. The agreement could also allow
for clearer rules to protect against both protectionism and cul-
tural imperialism. The formal rules would need to stipulate
how quotas, subsidies, and other measures would be applied in
order to protect against excessively restrictive policies that
foster counterfeit networks. The rules could also make allow-
ances for a balance of culturally protective measures against
those guaranteed in TRIPS. Should these issues not be
addressed, piracy of U.S. films in China is likely to continue to
have a detrimental effect for both Hollywood and Chinese con-
sumers alike.
239. See generally IACC 2005 Special 301 Recommendations, supra note 81, at
11-32.
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